The last few years have witnessed intensified strategic space cooperation between India and US. The decision to start a Space Security Dialogue, 2015 followed by the signing of Space Situational Awareness MOU, 2021 are substantial steps in this regard. The Indian Space Research Organisation has also been actively working with the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency in outer space cooperation for earth observation, satellite navigation and lunar cooperation.
China’s burgeoning space capabilities are, perhaps, one of the primary drivers behind such bilateral initiatives. At the heart of space rivalry and securitisation is the changing balance of power dynamic in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Two emerging astropolitical coalitions are: Signatories to the US led Artemis Accords and others with alternate plans for an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), i.e., China and Russia. India, despite its recent expanding space cooperation with the US and dwindling cooperation with Russia, is the only remaining significant space faring nation that hasn’t become a signatory to the Artemis Accords or the ILRS.
Given this backdrop, space cooperation in the QUAD assumes significance. India feels comfortable in the QUAD framework. It routinely stresses QUAD’s flexibility, its multifaceted objectives and non-alliance structure. QUAD, in Sept 2021, resolved to ensure uninterrupted access to space through framing consensual outer space governance rules and norms. A part of this initiative is ideal debris management practices for fostering outer space sustainability.
However, the larger idea is framing rules to restrain irresponsible acts by space powers, prevent space conflicts and limit exploitation of orbital resources.
A potential arena of cooperation for the QUAD could be the development of a “resilient space architecture”to match Chinese advances in Belt and Road Space Information Corridor14. China aims to create a “four in one” space information service that integrates sensing, transmission and use of geospatial information.
If a similar project is developed by the QUAD, it can foster policy coordination, service cooperation and also create a model for like-minded space faring nations in the Indo-Pacific. Such a model also complements QUAD’s vision for creating outer space governance rules and norms.
Another arena of space cooperation for QUAD includes leveraging individual expertise for developing requisite technological capacities for outer space strategic deterrence. Space Traffic Management is an additional area which could enhance QUAD’s efforts for sustainable space.
As far as Lunar space coalitions are concerned, India faces a host of imperfect options, between the Artemis Accords, ILRS or remaining in COPUOS. The most reasonable bet would be to withdraw from Moon Treaty 1971 and join the Artemis Accords, while parallelly deepening bilateral space cooperation with Russia.
This option boosts India’s lunar exploratory capabilities, creates possibilities for orbital resource extraction and also gives it a seat at the table, along with QUAD, for shaping outer space governance rules and norms.
Gulf security is perilous with or without a revived Iran nuclear accord
Ved Shinde, Student of Political Science and Economics at St. Stephens College, Delhi University
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With the fate hanging in the balance of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program, prospects for greater security and stability in the Middle East are meagre with or without a deal.
Undoubtedly, the region will be better off with a revival of the accord from which the United States walked away in 2018 than without a US and Iranian recommitment to the deal.
A recommitment could be only days away if European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is right. Adding to the anticipation, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said the United States was also “cautiously optimistic.”
Even so, the impact of a revival is likely to be limited.
It is safe to assume that the covert war between Israel, bitterly opposed to a revival of the agreement, and Iran will continue irrespective of whether Iran and the United States recommit to the deal.
The war is being fought not only on Iranian and Israeli territory and cyberspace but also in other parts of the Middle East, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and potentially Yemen.
“Most leaders and senior officials in Israel’s current government believe that while Iran’s acquisition of such (nuclear) weapons will pose very serious security challenges, Israel is a regional power possessing a wide range of options for dealing with such challenges. Among these many options is a more explicit deterrence posture, utilizing the country’s alleged ‘nuclear option.’ Thus, in a recent event at Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), (Israeli Prime Minister Yair) Lapid made reference to his country’s ’other capabilities,’ praising the AEC’s ranks and leadership for insuring Israel’s survival,” noted Israel scholar Shai Feldman.
Israel is, so far, the Middle East’s only nuclear state, even though it has never acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons or signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Gulf states share Israel’s concern that the agreement, at best, slows Iranian progress towards becoming a nuclear power and does nothing to halt Iranian support for allied non-state actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and Houthi rebels in Yemen or Iran’s ballistic missiles program.
However, Iran has so far refused to discuss those issues. That could change if they were considered part of a holistic discussion of regional security. That, in turn, would have to involve all parties, including Israel and Turkey, and potentially be linked to security in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and South Asia.
Adding to the limited impact of a revival of the nuclear deal is uncertainty about the sustainability of the dialling down of tensions in the Middle East between Israel, Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran.
The fragility of some of these relationships is evident in the slow progress of efforts to renew ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran; Turkey and Egypt; and differences and rivalries between various Middle Eastern players, including Turkey, Israel and Iran, and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as they play out in countries like Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraqi Kurdistan.
The fragility is evident in the lack of confidence complicating Russian-mediated efforts to achieve a rapprochement between Turkey and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, the Russian attempt reverberates in the Gulf, where Qatar and Saudi Arabia oppose UAE endeavors to return Mr. Al-Assad to the Arab fold, 11 years after Syrian membership in the Arab League was suspended because of the civil war.
Add to that the proxy war between Iran, Turkey, and Israel fought over the backs of Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi-Turkish tensions because of Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq that target Turkish Kurdish rebels.
Recent rocket attacks on a UAE-owned oil field in northern Iraq persuaded US contractors to abandon the project for a second time. Nobody has claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Mitigating in favour of a firmer grounding of the reduction of regional tension is the fact that it is driven not only by economic factors such as the economic transition in the Gulf and the economic crisis in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt but also by geopolitics.
China and Russia have spelled out that they would only entertain the possibility of greater engagement in regional security if Middle Eastern players take greater responsibility for managing regional conflicts, reducing tensions, and their own defense.
Rhetoric aside, that is not different from what the United States, the provider of the Middle East’ security umbrella, is looking for in its attempts to rejigger its commitment to security in the Gulf.
The implication is that a transition is inevitable in the longer term to a multilateral regional security architecture that could still have the US as its military backbone.
The trend towards multilateralism will be driven as much by the strategic US focus on Asia, the effort to reduce European reliance on Russian energy in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, and, ultimately, Chinese unwillingness to be dependent on a hostile US for its energy security.
The understandings and agreements between all regional states, including those that do not have diplomatic relations, such as Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, needed to introduce a multilateral security arrangement would be paradigm-shifting and tectonic.
The sea change would have to be based on three principles enunciated this week by Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar regarding his country’s relations with China that are equally applicable in the Middle East: mutual sensitivity, mutual respect, and mutual interest.
The understandings and agreements would have to involve credible abandonment of notions of regime change; recognition of the internationally recognized borders of all regional states, including Israel; non-aggression pacts; conflict management and conflict resolution mechanisms; arms control; a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and a nuclear free zone, to name the most difficult and seemingly utopian ones.
Given its ambition to play a more prominent role, India could significantly enhance its influence in the Middle East and set the tone if it were willing to join the admittedly troublednon-proliferation pact.
That would have to involve Pakistan also joining the NPT on the back of a genuine effort by both countries to resolve their differences and a halt to discriminatory anti-Muslim policies of the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi – steps that seem as impossible as the moves that Middle Eastern states would need to make.
The NPT’s shortcomings, beyond the refusal of nuclear states like Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea to join the treaty, were highlighted when signatories disagreed on a review of the 50-year-old pact last month.
Even so, a recent opinion poll in Saudi Arabia showed that India has some way to go in convincing the Middle East of its relevance compared to the United States, Russia, China, and Europe. Only 37 per cent of those surveyed believed ties to India were important to the kingdom.
India signalled its ambition to project power and membership in an elite club of nations with the commissioning this week of its first domestically built aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant.
The biggest obstacle to a more stable regional security architecture is the deep-seated hostility and distrust between Israel and Iran against the backdrop of a seemingly inevitable nuclear arms race in which Saudi Arabia and Turkey would strive to obtain capabilities of their own.
That race will be accelerated if efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal fail but will not be definitively thwarted if Iran and the United States recommit to the agreement.
The fact that the fate of Iran’s nuclear program is the switch at a Middle Eastern crossroads underscores the need to tackle sensitive issues head-on rather than kick the can down the road for opportunistic domestic political reasons.
It also highlights the need for a concerted regional and international effort and confidence-building measures inspired by the concessions they would entail. That, in turn, would require the political will to revisit issues without the debilitating lens of ideology, preconception, and prejudice.
Iran’s nuclear program is a case in point.
In the 1980s, Iran’s leaders revived the country’s nuclear program as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The program was originally initiated in the 1960s by the Shah and initially put on hold in the wake of the 1979 Islamic revolution.
However, the war persuaded Iran’s leader that the program could be a deterrence against perceived US efforts to change the regime In Tehran. The conviction that the United States and the Gulf were seeking to topple the Islamic regime was cemented by their support for Iraq’s eight-year war in which Saddam Hussein, a no-less brutal leader than Iran’s revolutionaries, deployed chemical weapons.
The Gulf war also sparked the Islamic republic’s ballistic missile program and its interest in developing a chemical weapons capability. Iranian leaders’ willingness to work with Israelis suggested they were not picky in choosing whom to cooperate with to achieve their goals.
To be sure, the knife cuts both ways. Iran’s declared ambition to export the revolution, coupled with the 444-day occupation in 1979 and 1980 of the US embassy in Tehran, was destined to provoke a response.
Yet, when Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1988 swallowed the “poison” of agreeing to a ceasefire with Iraq in a war that Iran had not started, nationalism had largely replaced revolutionary zeal.
The subsequent emergence of pro-Iranian militias in various Arab countries was part of a defense and security strategy designed to take the fight to Iran’s detractors and an effort to ensure Iranian regional influence rather than export the revolution per se.
There is no guarantee that less US, European, and Gulf support for Iraq’s war effort and a more evenhanded approach to the conflict would have set the Islamic republic and the Middle East on a different course. But, by the same token, there is no guarantee that the region would be worse off had the international community attempted to do so.
Whatever the case, the reality is that Iran today is at the very least close to becoming a nuclear threshold state and will be one with or without a revival of the nuclear accord. That does not mean that the agreement has become irrelevant. On the contrary, its fate, no matter how flawed or problematic the agreement may be, will shape regional security in the foreseeable future.
It will determine the environment in which confidence can or cannot be built, and understandings can be achieved on sensitive issues without which any attempted multilateral security architecture will either be impossible to construct or if created, likely to collapse if it is not stillborn from the outset.
A realistic assessment of what is possible could help kickstart a process to create a more sustainable basis for a dialling down of regional tensions.
One such assessment would be a realistic evaluation of military options to halt Iran’s nuclear program.
Respected Israeli national security journalist Yossi Melman argues that Israel lacks the military capabilities to destroy Iran’s decentralised program despite claims to the contrary, partly because the US has not sold its bunker-busting bombs.
“The United States is the only country with a military option against Iran. But…(has) eschewed that route,” Mr. Melman noted.
Similarly, Iran and its detractors risk being blinded by their perceptions of the other, which become a self-fulfilling prophecy reinforced by mutual demonization.
Mr. Melman notes that countries like Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea determined to develop nuclear weapons did so within five to seven years. Iran revived its nuclear program more than three decades ago.
“How can we explain that 35 years after it launched its efforts, Iran still doesn’t have a bomb and hasn’t even passed the nuclear threshold?” Mr. Melman asked in a recent analysis.
Every year, the day comes and goes by. This year the Pakistani nation should celebrate Defence of Pakistan Day (Sept 6) as a day of introspection. Let us do some soul searching. India is arming itself to the hilt. Despite economic setbacks due to Covid 19, Indian economy has stayed put. They do not have to go country to country with a begging bowl.
On this day, we should take stock of Pakistan’s geo-political environment. What is the plight of the weak Muslim countries? How remorselessly their territorial integrity was trampled by a super power for not toeing the line. India is arming its land and marine forces to the hilt. She is refurbishing its old assets and stockpiling new equipment. India’s Defence Acquisition Council convened by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh delegated powers to the forces to procure equipment worth up to ‘300 crore under the emergency clause, which does away with the lengthy procurement process that can drag on for years.
Here is a bird’s eye view of India’s arms build-up.
With the $3 billion Vikrant, India will join only a small number of nations with more than one aircraft carrier or helicopter carrier in service. It has become the third country, after the UK and China, to have commissioned a domestically built aircraft carrier in the past three years.
John Bradford, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said India’s commitment to the ship reflected its “long-term vision to maintain a world-class naval force.”
“There are looming questions about the survivability of any carrier in the missile age, but major navies, including those of the US, Japan, China and the UK, have doubled their carrier investments.
The Vikrant is India’s first domestically built aircraft carrier. It joins the carrier INS Vikramaditya, a refurbished Soviet-era carrier bought from Russia in 2004, in India’s fleet.
With a displacement of around 40,000 tons, the Vikrant is slightly smaller than the Vikramaditya and the carriers of the US, China and UK though it is larger than Japan’s.
But analysts praised its potential firepower.
When its air wing becomes fully operational over the next few years, it will carry up to 30 aircraft, including MiG-29K fighter jets to be launched from its ski-ramp style deck, and helicopters as well as defensive systems including surface-to-air missiles.
Powered by four gas turbine engines, its top speed is estimated at 32 mph (52 kph) with a range of 8,600 miles (13,890 kilometers). India’s message to its neighbours is “India has the power, it has the aircraft carriers and therefore the air power to dominate the distant reaches of the Indian Ocean”.
The Vikrant has a range of 8,600 miles (13,890 kilometers).
Besides, India is balding Scorpion submarines (costing Rs 20,000 crore) with 11,000 km range being built in India. These subs can stay at sea for 50 days and can carry missiles, mines and torpedoes to attack surface vessels.
India has eight P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft, costing Rs 13000 crore. They can fly 4,000 km, stay airborne for 12 hours and attack surface targets with missiles or patrol coastline. Add to it procurement of Rafael jets from France.
India has 14 mobile multiple rocket launchers which can carpet bomb targets 90 km away. One hundred air defence missiles, costing over Rs 4,000 crore, to shoot down enemy aircraft. Four hundred 155 mm self-propelled guns, costing over Rs 3,200 crore. These are howitzers on tank chassis. They also include wheeled and towed variants like Bofors howitzers. They provide mobile fire cover for advancing infantry by hitting targets 90 km away.
Backed up by nuclear cooperation with the USA, India wants to increase its store of thermo-nuclear bombs manifold. To achieve this aim, it wants to set up new breeder reactors. India has told the USA point-blank that ‘it would not put its breeder reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards’. Already, a 13 MWe Fast Breeder Test Reactor is operational at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at Kalpakkam. Another 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor is also under construction here. India’s Department of Atomic Energy built four more breeder reactors of 500 MWe capacities.
India has enhanced its cooperation with France in breeder-technology development. Interestingly, France surreptitiously stepped in to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur-1 and 2 reactors when the U.S. stalled contractual supplies after Pokhran-1 test explosion. Capacity of Kalpakkam fast breeder reactor has been increased from 13 MWe to the 500 MWe.
Breeder reactors develop nuclear energy first by using thermal reactors to produce plutonium and, then using the plutonium with depleted natural uranium, produce more plutonium in the fast breeder reactors. Besides India and France, Russia, Japan, and China have an active interest in fast breeders. Pakistan’s upcoming facility at Khoshab has been blown out of proportion in international media. But, India’s nuclear enrichment activities are not in focus.
Each year India increases her defence budget manifold to strengthen her nuclear and conventional warfare capabilities. India believes that Pakistan will continue to be forced to increase her defence expenditure each time India increases her defence expenditure.
India’s assessment is that if she spends 2.5 per cent of her gross Domestic Product on defence, Pakistan would have to spend 13 per cent of GDP to match the Indian military budget in absolute size, Pakistan’s economy being 19 per cent the size of India’s economy. In India’s strategic estimation, even with stable economic growth, Pakistan could only afford to allocate 6.5 per cent of its GDP to defence. A higher allocation would sap resource potential for sustained growth in future. India thinks Pakistan has to choose between Scylla and Charybdis that is economic collapse or defence preparations (same quandary as of former USSR).
Will every new baby be born in Pakistan indebted forever? We consume debts as if they were freebies. We made no effort to get our “odious debts” written off.
Pakistan’s debt burden has a political tinge. The USA rewarded Pakistan by showering grants on Pakistan for joining anti-Soviet-Union alliances (South-East Asian Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation). With advice from a Harvard group of economists, Ayub Khan tried to steer the economy in a planned and prioritized manner. A Perspective and five-year plans were drawn up, implemented and evaluated after the due period. The less said about the subsequent period, the better.
The grants evaporated into streams of low-interest loan which ballooned as Pakistan complied with forced devaluations or adopted floating exchange rate. Soon, the donors forgot Pakistan’s contribution to the break-up of the `Soviet Union’. They used coalition support funds and our debt-servicing liability as `do more’ mantra levers.
In economics there are burden-of-debt models that could help decide how productively the debt should be so used that both principal and debt-service could be repaid. Unfortunately we spent the debt as if it were a non-repayable windfall bonanza.
Apparently, all Pakistani debts are odious as they were thrust upon praetorian regimes to bring them within anti-Communist (South East Asian Treaty Organisation, Central Treaty Organisation) or anti-`terrorist’ fold.
Several IMF and US state department delegations visited Pakistan. But, Pakistan could not tell them point-blank about non-liability to service politically-stringed debts. The government’s dilemma in Pakistan is that defence and anti-terrorism outlays (26 per cent) plus debt-service charges leave little in national kitty for welfare. Solution lies in debt forgiveness by donors (James K. Boyce and Madakene O’Donnell(eds.), Peace and the Public Purse.2008. New Delhi. Viva Books p, 251).
What a pity! Whenever the International Monetary Fund’s delegation’s visit, Pakistan’s representatives keep mum about the politically-motivated odious nature of our debt burden. They lack the nerve to tell them point-blank Pakistan’s non-liability to service politically-stringed debts. They government’s dilemma in Pakistan is that defence and anti-terrorism outlays plus debt-service charges leave little in national kitty for welfare. Solution lies in debt forgiveness by donors (James K. Boyce and Madakene O’Donnell (eds.), Peace and the Public Purse.2008. New Delhi. Viva Books, p. 251).
Benefits of Write-Off: Debt forgiveness (or relief) helps stabilise weak democracies, though corrupt, despotic and incompetent. Research shows that debt relief promotes economic growth and boosts foreign investment. Sachs (1989) inferred that debt service costs discourage domestic and foreign investment. Kanbur (2000), also, concluded that debt is a drag on private investment.
Political parties without economic agenda
Parties win elections by pandering to base sentiments of the people. A key element of election slogans is always ‘change’. But, the nitty-gritty of the ‘change’ remains a strictly guarded mumbo jumbo. Sincerity demands that the parties should spell out their policies with regard to various factors of production, i.e. land, natural resources, the socio-economic milieu, labour, capital and organisation. But, they keep mum about their agenda. In their hearts, the leaders knew that the voters have little choice. They would vote either for the charisma of one leader or against the hatred of another. The voters do not force the leaders to give a dispassionate perception of the country’s problems along with an inventory of prioritised solutions.
Intellectual apathy has been the hallmark of elections. There is no tradition of political parties having shadow cabinets with a bagful of alternative policies.
The taxation proposals do little to squeeze the haves. Nothing is done to reduce inequitable distribution of wealth and economic power. No heed is paid to the structure of our society. How did the filthy rich, the feudal lords and the industrial robber barons come into being? If accumulated wealth in a few hands is rooted in wrongdoing, a considerable chunk of it should be mopped up. Vested interests resist the change.
The British created a class of chieftains to suit their need for loyalists, war fundraisers and recruiters in the post-‘mutiny’ period and during the Second World War. A royal gubernatorial gazetteer states: “I have for many years felt convinced that the time had arrived for the Government to try to introduce some distinction for those who can show hereditary services before the Humble Company’s rule in India ceased. I have often said that I should be proud to wear a Copper Order, bearing merely the words ‘Teesri pusht Sirkar Company ka Naukar’ (Third generation Company’s servant).” A feudal aristocracy was created whose generations ruled post-independence governments. Some pirs and mashaikh (religious leaders) even quoted verses from the Holy Quran to justify allegiance to the Englishman (amir), after loyalty to Allah and the Messenger (PBUH). They pointed out that the Quran ordained that ehsan (favour) be returned with favour. The ehsan were British favours like titles (khan bahadur, nabob, etc), honorary medals, khilat with attached money rewards, life pensions, office of honorary magistrate, assistant commissioner, courtier, etc. A Tiwana military officer even testified in favour of O’Dwyer when the latter was under trial. Ayub Khan added the chapter of 22 families to the aristocracy, a legacy of the English Raj.
About 460 scions of the pre-partition chiefs along with industrial barons created in the Ayub era are returned again and again to the Assemblies. They do not allow agricultural incomes, industrial profits or real estate to be adequately taxed.
Economic advisor’s view of the economic malaise
In his book Growth and Inequality in Pakistan: Agenda for Reforms (pages 383 to 403), Hafiz A. Pasha has unwound the tangled skein of Pakistan’s economic malaise. He laments that income-and-wealth-tax rules and regulations are so drafted as to facilitate `state capture by the elite’.
The tax-concession-and-exemption laws” give special privileges to different vested interests. The privileges are in the form of “preferential excess to land, bank credit, etc, which facilitate faster accumulation of assets”. He visualises “elite “as “the conglomeration of rich powerful people in society”. Among the “elite state captors”, he includes “large land-owners, defence establishment, multinational companies, urban property developers, and owners, and so on” (page 383, ibid.).
Why have successive Pakistani governments failed to provide universal healthcare and education to their people? There are several points to ponder.
Pakistan’s healthcare system is in shambles. There is only one hospital for federal civil servants that are Federal Government “Services” Hospital. Instead of establishing new hospitals. The successive civil governments allowed non-employee civilian residents of Rawalpindi and Islamabad and those who happen to have CNICs of the said cities to get free treatment at the said hospital. Because of overcrowding, the hospital has become good for nothing for civil servants.
Elderly civil centres have to queue up with unauthorised non employee civilians. There are no separate queues for “civil servants”. Doctors give preferential treatment to non-employees who pay them hefty fees at their private clinics. Civil servants are given long dates for operation theatre procedures. I, for one, am a septuagenarian retiree with cumulative 40 years service. I have been directed to wait for next year to get operated by urologist. The FGSH is the only hospital in the world where beds have been allocated to doctors whose names are printed on walls. The lavatories stink. Essential medicines are unavailable.
Even senior civil servants with a lifetime of service have to stink in general wards. The officers’ wards are allotted to non-civil-servants who have a way with the muckraker doctors. There is a need to transfer non-employee patients to nearby PIMS hospital. Or non-employees should be treated as private patients. A thorough probe into hospital funds, medical procurements and unethical practices by doctors is warranted.
The politically expedient burden of residents of Rawalpindi/Islamabad on Federal Government Services Hospital should be taken off.
The ‘civilian officers, serving and retired, paid out of defense services’ should be impaneled to the military (CMH/AFIC) to reduce the FGSH patient load. A revolving fund may be created to entitle them and their families for 7/24 treatment subject to payment of contributory share to a revolving fund or actual expenses payable by a patient.
No healthcare system, not even the US ‘system’, in the world is perfect. Yet, each, by and large, delivers the goods. The familiar medical system of wealthy countries is the Bismarck model (multi-payer health-insurance model), the Beveridge model, the National Health Insurance Model, the out-of-pocket model, and the US model. The government should pick up good points of medical systems of wealthy and poor countries alike. The Bismarck model is being followed in Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.
Generally, healthcare providers in this model are private entities. The government neither owns nor employs most physicians. Health insurance also is provided by private companies, not by the governments. Governments strictly regulate costs and other aspects of healthcare (no arbitrary fees and fleecing). The US outspends its peer nations on health. Yet it has no universal health insurance, nor universal health coverage.
Thailand’s successful healthcare plan reflects three lessons: being prepared, exercising tight control, and being pragmatic and politically broadminded.
Thailand took opposition and other stakeholders aboard. As such, the plan remained intact despite the change of governments. Thailand’s per capita income, health expenditures, and tax base are comparable to India. Yet, it achieved universal healthcare in 2002.
It spends around four percent of its Gross Domestic Product on health. In Thailand, the out-of-pocket medical expense has fallen to 12 percent, as compared to 40pc to 60pc percent in wealthy countries. The proportion of children dying in the first five years of life fell to less than 1.2 percent.
Pakistan is doubtlessly an Islamic republic, but not a theocracy, as envisioned by the founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah. AK Brohi has in his The Fundamental Law of Pakistan highlighted the contours of a theocracy very well. The Islamic preamble (Objectives Resolution) was inserted in the draft constitution under Pakistan’s prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s influence. Unlike the US and many other secular constitutions, the Objectives Resolution (now Preamble to 1973 Constitution) states sovereignty belongs to Allah Almighty. The golden words of the constitution were warped to continue an interest-based economy. We pay interest on our international loans and international transactions. Do we live in an interactive world or in an ivory tower?
The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan enforced Shariah Governance Regulations 2018. This regulation is a follow-up to Article 38 (f) of the Constitution of Pakistan, and Senate resolution No. 393 (July 9, 2018) for the abolition of riba (usury).
The regulation is welcome but there are unanswered questions about the Islamisation of finance in Pakistan. We pay interest on our loans and international transactions. Let Pakistan face the truth. It needs to evolve and showcase a politico-economic model of Islam that is compatible with international practices. Or else, dispense with hypocritical patchwork, and go for the secularist IMF model. What is the justification of the top-heavy paraphernalia of a civil government if it can’t even provide healthcare and education to its people?
Future trading is a hub of modern commerce. Yet, it is forbidden under Islam. Islamic law of contract does not even allow advance contracts concerning raw fish, fruit, or anything involving an element of uncertainty. Islam does not allow even tallaqi-ur-rukbaan buying camel-loads of goods from the caravan before they reached Madina open-market.
Converting consumerist Pakistan into a productive economy
Let China help expand Pakistan’s manufacturing capacity and thereby reduce unemployment in Pakistan. All policymakers should act in unison. They include policy formulators (prime minister, finance minister, et. al), policy detailers (chief economic adviser, statisticians), and technocrats. The policy-makers should decide upon a balance of priority, agriculture or industry, a “closed” economy with import substitution, “living within means” and a balanced budget or deficit budget. Will increased spending “crowd in” or “crowd out” private investment?
Monetary policy objectives and the role of the central bank stability of employment and inflation, growth rate, balance-of-payments issues, the role of foreign direct investment and non-bank financial institutions? Their impact on capital formation, consumption trends, and other macroeconomic aspects.
Building Kalabagh and other dams
The first priority of most countries, including the USA, Russia, Brazil, and China, was to build hydel projects, a clean source of energy.. China’s big push into industrial progress was due to a chain of hydel projects like the Three Gorges, Gezhouba, Xiluodu, Xiangjiaba, Longtan, Hengshui, Nuozhadu, Jinping-I and II, Yalong, Laxiwa, Xiaowan, Goupitan, Guanyinyan, and Ahai.
The Kalabagh Dam Project was approved by the Technical Committee on Water Resources 2003-2005. It was composed of eight technical experts, two from each province. To store monsoon flows of the upper reaches of the Indus River, they approved the project. The committee looked into all aspects including the effect of dilution of seawater with freshwater, seawater intrusion into the groundwater, riverine irrigation, and forest fisheries, besides the growth of Mangrove forests. Later, the 3500 megawatts KBD was approved by the World Bank Indus Special Study Group in its report titled Development of Water and Power Resources of Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis (1967).
The estimated cost of constructing the dam was US$6.12 billion, over six years from 1977 to 1982. After the commissioning of the Tarbela Dam in 1976, the dam could have been built in six years by 1982. The cost per unit of 12 billion units the hydel electricity was Rs.1.5 as compared to Rs. 16.5 per unit from thermal sources. We are losing Rs. 180 billion per year due to ten times costlier production (12billion xRs.15 billion). Add to it loss of US$ 6.12 billion per annum due to the superfluous flow of 30 Million Acre Feet of water from Kotri Barrage into the Arabian Sea (one MAF valued at US$1-1.5 billion).
Our water resources reserves have not risen pari passu with growth in population. Three provincial assemblies resolved against building the KBD. A politician alleged the dam would convert Sindh into a desert. Apprehensions against the dam could be allayed by reviewing Water Apportionment Accord (as directed by Lahore High Court also vide its Order dated November 29, 2012, case no. WP 8777). No justification to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.
We could learn a lot from the planning and development experience of the Ayub era. Is it fair to devolve dam building to provinces? Pakistan has abolished interest (riba) in accordance with its fundamental law. Yet its banking sector and international transactions are interest-based.
To make Pakistan strong, its citizens should contribute their moitié.
In July 2022, the Department of State and the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved the sale of F-35A Lightning II multirole combat aircraft to Germany. This came as a climax of quite a protracted and a rather tragicomic story of Germany’s Luftwaffe purchasing a new carrier of nuclear weapons to carry out “NATO nuclear sharing.”
Today’s NATO nuclear sharing is a legacy of the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR, which has effectively evolved into a policy relic over the 30 years that followed. RIAC has already described the history of the program in detail. The first carriers of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Germany were deployed in October 1953 when the U.S. forces stationed in Germany received first specialized M65 cannons designed to fire nuclear devices. Over a few years, the U.S. Air Force acquired surface-to-surface guided missiles, such as MGR-1 Honest John and MGM-5 Corporal, air bombs, and MGM-1 Matador, the first operational surface-to-surface cruise missile.
Curiously, back then, the U.S. government had no official permission from the German government (and never requested it), such as a ratified international treaty. However, striving to maintain friendly ties and acting out of “intra-alliance politeness,” Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was notified of these steps and of the U.S. army’s readiness to use the TNW in military hostilities waged in Germany in case of war with the USSR, even though the Chancellor was to understand that the U.S., as an occupying power, did not need his consent. However, published documents show that the U.S. was concerned with this matter in view of the future, in case special rights to deploy troops were to be abolished.[1] It should be noted that some interpretations posit the German authorities still may not dispute the U.S. right to deploy its troops.[2] Practically speaking, though, these are legal conflicts: U.S. troops, including nuclear weapons, are deployed in Germany with consent of local authorities, and it can hardly be imagined that they would not be withdrawn should the local authorities firmly demand it. On the contrary, when President Donald Trump announced a redeployment of some U.S. troops to other European states, German and pro-Democrat U.S. media presented it as a tragedy that could undermine U.S.–Germany allied relations and NATO’s solidarity, while the Pentagon was sabotaging this decision until Joe Biden abolished it altogether, something the media painted as a great blessing.
Adenauer’s laid-back attitude to nuclear weapons is easy to explain. In the 1950s, today’s concept of non-proliferation was not yet conceived, and West Germany’s leaders envisaged their country to become a nuclear power in a medium-term outlook[3]—as did, for instance, the leaders of Sweden or Italy. For the time being, allied weapons were enough, especially since the U.S. began steering a course for arming its NATO allies with nuclear weapons in the late 1950s, at least by training them and by providing carriers. In the future, the U.S. seemed intent on establishing “NATO’s united nuclear forces” that were sometimes visualized in rather exotic forms, whether a joint force operating intermediate-range missiles stationed in silos under a glacier in Greenland or joint fleets disguised as transport vessels carrying ballistic missiles or rail-based missile complexes cruising around Europe.
However, more practical work was underway in the late 1950s. In 1958, when NATO Atomic Stockpile program was launched with a view to increasing military capabilities of the allied armies under NATO’s new MC 70 directive, [4]the new Luftwaffe was already receiving U.S. F-84F Thunderstreak bombers, which were largely designed as nuclear bomb carriers. The Department of State’s European Bureau noted in a memorandum of November 1958 that West Germany had ordered “dual purpose” systems—such as MIM-14 Nike Hercules SAM systems, MGR-1 Honest John rockets, and Matador cruise missiles—to be delivered shortly.[5]
With discussions and debates on the issue transpiring in the U.S. itself, the militaries were still engaged in fairly close cooperation, exchanged experience while steering clear of any political discussions and the nascent movement for nuclear non-proliferation. For instance, when inspecting the status of American nuclear weapons in Germany in September 1962, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his colleagues visited a Luftwaffe airbase to discover that “warheads were … stored aboard those aircraft on alert status. The assumption that the German pilots do not know how to arm these warheads turns out to be fictional; on request, one of the pilots showed the U.S. visitors how this was done.”[6] Later, West Germany received several nuclear weapons carriers, including Pershing 1a ballistic missiles with a range of about 740 km, which could strike targets not only in East Germany but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Later, the Luftwaffe used the U.S.-purchased F-104G Starfighter for nuclear aviation bomb carriers (using a high-altitude interceptor as a low-level strike aircraft largely resulted in its notoriously many crashes) and Panavia Tornado strike fighters, a joint product of Italy, Britain and Germany. Officially, the U.S. military remained in control of all the payloads—in practice, though, both the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe would operate in a combat situation as full-fledged nuclear forces within NATO’s allied forces.
Once the Cold War ended, the presence of U.S. troops in Europe, the armies of its local allies, and local American tactical nuclear weapons were being rapidly reduced. Consequently, America’s European nuclear arsenal was reduced by an order of magnitude. All the TNWs were eliminated, except for B61 free-fall air bombs for army air forces. The U.S. withdrew nuclear weapons from the UK, South Korea, and Japan, and nuclear weapons in other states were significantly reduced. Unofficial estimates claim that there are now about a hundred B61-3 and B61-4 bombs deployed in five states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Germany) at six air bases equipped with special WS3 hangar storage systems.[7]
In Germany, bombs—likely totaling no more than 20 units—are deployed at the Büchel airbase in Rhineland-Palatinate in the country’s southwest. Nörvenich and Ramstein air bases are no longer used for the purpose, even though the latter had 55 WS3 systems, the largest number built in Europe (Büchel only has 11), enough to house up to 220 bombs.[8]
Only the 33rd tactical Luftwaffe wing (Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 33, TaktLwG 33) stationed in Büchel is trained in the use of nuclear weapons on Tornado IDS strike aircraft. This unit is among the oldest in the “new” iteration of the Luftwaffe, the first air wing to fly jet fighter bombers (in 1958, they flew the above-mentioned F-84F Thunderstreak); originally, this unit was led by Walter Krupinski, one of the Nazi Luftwaffe’s highest-scoring pilots in World War II. [9] The 702nd Munitions Support Squadron of the 52nd MUNSS services the bombs and trains technicians and pilots. In addition to regular personnel, air base security is provided by a special Luftwaffe ground force unit, “security squadron S” (Luftwaffensicherungsstaffel „S“).
Despite the general public’s predominantly negative attitude and despite populist statements coming from politicians representing several parties (statements these politicians usually “forget” once they come to power, as happened, for instance, with Annalena Baerbock, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the anti-nuclear Greens), Germany’s military political leadership clearly did not want U.S. nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from the country even before NATO’s current exacerbation in relations with Russia. Otherwise, Germany’s leaders would have achieved it back during the quiet 1990s–2000s, as, for instance, the British leadership did under public pressure. If we look past the perfunctory statements of allied solidarity, Germany’s leadership apparently sees American nuclear bombs as a tool for upgrading Germany’s status within NATO to the “semi-nuclear inner circle,” as well as a means of making its voice louder in the Alliance’s nuclear planning group.
Besides, American and NATO politicians exploit German establishment’s fear of Poland getting excessively strong should Germany “slacken.” For instance, in late 2021, when Germany was discussing American nuclear bombs once again, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Q&A session after his speech at the German Atlantic Association Conference, threatened that should Berlin demand a withdrawal of nuclear weapons they will appear “east of Germany” as part of the U.S. bilateral treaty with some other state (that is, utterly outside NATO’s control). [10] Naturally, in connection with the current public sentiments in NATO states, the launch of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine puts to rest the matter of possible reductions in NATO’s nuclear sharing for the foreseeable future.
Punch line for a long-running joke
For Germany, its continued participation in nuclear sharing was tied to the long-running problem of carrier aircraft. Since the 1980s, the principal (and soon only) carriers of American B61 bombs in European air forces were the F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role fighters purchased in the U.S. or the Europe-designed Tornado aircraft. Today, the former are used in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey, while the latter are deployed in Germany and Italy. Both aircraft were produced in the 1980s–early 1990s, and they are outdated and old, which suggests they should soon be put out of service.
Four out of five states have already decided to purchase F-35A Lightning II, a fifth-generation multirole stealth aircraft that Washington labels as the principal carrier of B61-12, a thermonuclear bomb that comes as a guided and high-precision update of B61. The “Turkish question” still remains: following Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense missile system and because of a generally sharply exacerbated relations, Ankara was excluded from the program, and the fighters Turkey had already paid for were “arrested” in the U.S. This question, however, may be resolved in the future, and a purchase of a shipment of newly-made F-16 fighters is now discussed. In any case, there are reports of Turkish pilots having had no training in using nuclear weapons for a long time, while the bombs in Incirlik are the Middle Eastern cutting-edge arsenal for the U.S. air force itself.
It is easy to see that Germany alone was not on this list. Around 2016–2017, Germany was close to buying F-35, but then its relations with Washington cooled off as the United States under Donald Trump sharply criticized Berlin for insufficient defense spending (far below the 2% of the GDP recommended by NATO) and, therefore, for “mooching off” the U.S. in Germany’s security. In such a situation, Germany’s authorities decided—as a matter of principle—to purchase more European-made Eurofighter Typhoon multipurpose fighters.
The story of Luftwaffe Inspector Karl Müllner is utterly tragicomic: the General did not promptly toe the “party line” and continued to insist that F-35 needed to be bought as nuclear bomb carriers and even openly argued with Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen. As a result, he was forced to resign amid a scandal in the spring of 2018.
For a while, certifying Eurofighter Typhoon as a nuclear weapons carrier became the master plan for continued participation in nuclear sharing. Airbus was confident it could be done by 2025. Having to be involved in reconfiguring the fighter and willing to have the final say on whether the aircraft was ready, the U.S. began hinting that the process would take longer than Tornadoes would remain in service (and the time need to certify Tornado would “turn out” to be longer than any Tornado’s in-service time named by Germany).
Ultimately, the German government drove itself into a corner and decided in March 2020 to buy Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter bombers. The purchase of a small number (30) of originally carrier-based aircraft which did not enjoy much popularity on the global market, which were not aligned with Luftwaffe aircraft and with those of its NATO allies, which did not have better combat capabilities than Eurofighter Typhoon (for instance, F-35 is stealth aircraft and would open up new opportunities) looked like a hugely awkward decision Angela Merkel’s government made in a tortured manner for political reasons. It would have looked very silly had it decided to purchase F-35 once again, when it had harshly refused to purchase them two years prior. A small bonus consisted solely in purchasing, together with Super Hornets, 15 EA-18G Growler, EW aircraft (jamming, surveillance, air defense suppression) also designed by the Hornet. Currently, these tasks are carried out by old Tornado ECR aircraft that need to be replaced.
Another comic element in this story is that the Super Hornet has not been designed to carry B61 bombs and is not certified to carry nuclear weapons, [11] but the U.S. hinted that it would deal with that problem much faster. For some reason, arguments that “first, we would need to spend several years reconfiguring it carry F-35” cited against Eurofighter Typhoon have not been brought forward concerning the Super Hornet.
Everyone could easily see how impractical that decision was, and when new leaders came to power in Germany in the fall of 2021, Germans began taking careful steps towards “re-appraising” the possibility of purchasing F-35. The process, however, would have certainly been drawn out over several years since the subject was highly “toxic” both due to the issue of U.S. nuclear bombs as such and on account of the stupid predicament the former government had driven Germany into.
When Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, Berlin reacted with a truly lightning speed: the decision to buy F-35A Lightning II without a bidding process came as early as March 14. Essentially, it was the first practical step taken to buy additional equipment for the German armed forces. To support German manufacturers, the country decided to buy additional 15 Eurofighter Typhoon in its EW aircraft modification (that is, to finance its development since at the moment this modification is just a concept).
In late July, the U.S. Administration officially approved the deal; legislature is likely to promptly follow suit. In its Congressional notification, the DSCA estimated 35 F-35A fighters with equipment, spare and repair parts, weapons (including long-range cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER) and personnel training to cost USD 8.4 bn. [12]. Lockheed Martin, the fighter’s manufacturer, suggested that should the contract be signed in the near future, it could deliver first fighters to the Luftwaffe already in 2026; Tornado aircraft should last that long.
The German government managed to resolve its predicament by promptly using the changed geopolitical situation. Thanks to the F-35 purchase, they did everything they could to preserve the desired status quo of American nuclear weapons. The Luftwaffe will receive a fifth-generation stealth aircraft used by many of Germany’s NATO allies. Flying F-35 could prove useful for the program of developing forward-looking European FCAS fighter. On the other hand, purchasing F-35 reduces the need for a FCAS and additionally sours relations with France, a partner in the FCAS program, as France insists that Europe rely more on its own forces. Additionally, operating a small number of fighters that are not aligned with the rest of the Luftwaffe’s aircraft fleet will be a very expensive undertaking (unless, of course, Berlin decides, further down the road, to make F-35 one of the Luftwaffe’s main fighters).
However, Germany’s leadership is apparently ready and willing to pay for Germany’s semi-nuclear status. Most likely, America’s vestigial nuclear presence will remain in Europe for a long time, until some kind of an exchange deal with Russia, for instance, in the matter of the latter’s TNW (nuclear weapons were likely kept in Europe just for that purpose, as the military value of relatively few free-fall nuclear bombs is small). When the U.S. decides to get rid of these weapons, it will not consult its “privileged allies,” just like it did not consult them in the mid-1950s when deploying nuclear weapons in their country.
[1]For instance, “Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy Matters, ‘Memorandum of Negotiations Looking to Obtain Storage and Use Rights for Atomic Weapons in Western Germany,’” Draft, 12 August 1954 https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20483-national-security-archive-doc-02-gerard-c-smith
[2]Under the Bonn-Paris Conventions of 1952/54, the US, the UK, and France gave the Federal Republic of Germany much of its sovereignty back, with Germany, however, agreeing to a series of restrictions, including giving up the right to demand a withdrawal of foreign troops. These conventions are to remain in force until the Allies and Germany sign the final peace treaty, yet this treaty has never been and apparently will not be concluded. Under the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany that largely replaces such a peace treaty, the USSR alone gave up its right to deploy troops in Germany, and NATO undertook not to deploy its troops or nuclear weapons only in the former German Democratic Republic.
[3] “Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition” PRIF-Report No. 55/2000, p. 6
Click to access prif55.pdf
[4] “Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe History 1958” pp. 61-70
Click to access 20121126_SHAPE_HISTORY_-_1958.pdf
[5] “EUR/RA [Office of European Regional Affairs] Mr. Timmons to EUR [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs]- Mr. Merchant, ‘Atomic Armament of Germany,’” 25 November 1958
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20466-national-security-archive-doc-14-eur-ra-office
[6] “S/p [Policy Planning Council] Mr. Owen to G [Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs]: Mr. Johnson,’ Paul Nitze’s Report on Europe,’” 11 October 1962
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28570-document-32-sp-policy-planning-council-mr-owen-g-deputy-under-secretary-state
[7] “United States nuclear weapons, 2022,” Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, 9 May 2022, pp. 176-178
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2022.2062943
[8] “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” Hans M. Kristensen, February 2005, p. 13
Click to access euro.pdf
[9] He is credited with 197 air victories. Krupinski, by that time promoted to the commanding officer of the Luftwaffe, and several other high-ranking officers were told to retire only in 1976, when they, frankly speaking, finally bugged the hell out of civilian authorities with their openly Nazi opinions and insulting behavior toward political leaders of left-wing parties.
[10] “I expect that Germany will continue to be part of nuclear sharing because it is so important for the whole of Europe… The alternative to NATO nuclear sharing is different kinds of bilateral arrangements. … Germany can, of course, decide whether there will be nuclear weapons in your country. But the alternative is that we easily end up with nuclear weapons in all the countries of Europe, also to the east of Germany. So I think that nuclear sharing is a balanced, well-organized, tested structure for nuclear deterrence” audio recording (time code 41:30) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_188783.htm
[11] It was developed and put into service already after the US carrier-based aircraft completely abandoned nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s.
[12] We should note that the DSCA’s notifications are not contracts, and final deals sometimes come with very different packages and costs.
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